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Abstract
We study the eﬀects of a decrease in trade costs on the spatial distribution
of industry in a multi-regional economy, when a rise in the regional population
of workers generates higher urban costs. We show that high and low trade costs
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costs are linear, there exists a stable equilibrium for almost all values of trade
costs. Furthermore, as trade costs fall, there is a path of stable equilibria such that
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the increasing urban costs associated with the process of agglomeration.
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11 Introduction
Our primary purpose is to study the impact of the secular decline in trade costs (Bairoch,
1985), broadly deﬁned to include all impediments to the exchange of goods, on the spatial
distribution of economic activities when the number of regions is arbitrary. Indeed, models
of economic geography have so far focussed on a two-region setting (Krugman, 1991;
Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999). This makes the dynamic analysis very simple
since moving away from one region automatically implies that migrants (workers and
ﬁrms) go to the other region. Furthermore, it is not clear what the main result obtained
in economic geography, namely the existence of a core-periphery structure, becomes when
there are more than two regions. Indeed, a multi-regional economy is able to sustain
a much richer hierarchy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that an
analytical treatment of a multi-regional economy with mobile factors is addressed.
Our secondary purpose is to allow for urban costs to be paid by workers when residing
in a particular region. In this perspective, the core-periphery model has been criticized
because it does not account for the growing urban costs associated with the concentration
of ﬁrms and workers within the same region (Helpman, 1998; Tabuchi, 1998; Papageorgiou
and Pines, 1999). By ignoring the costs imposed by urban life, this model would remain in
the tradition of internationaltrade theory, and woul d thus failto provide a fair description
of the working of a spatialeconomy. Introducing urban costs is both reasonabl e and
meaningful. It is reasonable because an increasing concentration of workers and ﬁrms
within a region generates rising congestion costs. It is meaningfulbecause, in the absence
of such costs, when trade costs decrease the economy might move from full dispersion to
full agglomeration without passing through intermediate stages, a result that strikes us
as being very implausible.
In this paper, we extend the two-region modelproposed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and
Thisse (2001) to study the impact of falling trade costs on the equilibrium distributions
of ﬁrms and workers in the case of n regions, while permitting each region to have speciﬁc
urban costs (e.g., commuting and housing), which vary with the number of workers.
When the number of regions exceeds two, determining the equilibrium prices, wages,
and (indirect) utilities in each region becomes a hard task. Indeed, these expressions
typically depend on the whole distribution of the manufacturing sector across regions,
while they also vary with the region under consideration. In order to be able to work with a
tractable model, we make the simplifying assumption that regions are pairwise equidistant
so that trade costs are the same regardless of the origin and destination regions. Such an
assumption may be justiﬁed by the fact that distance-related transportation costs have
2become low enough while distance-unrelated costs such as tariﬀs, insurance, loading and
unloading are still relatively high. Likewise, communication costs are not very sensitive
to distance, but often involve high ﬁxed costs (think of portable telephones).
Regarding urban costs, our modeling strategy is as follows. Although we acknowledge
the fact that both trade and commuting costs have been decreasing since the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution, we assume that interregional transport costs decrease while
urban commuting costs are constant for a given population size. This assumption is made
to capture the idea that, in modern economies, trade costs of manufactured goods keep
decreasing at a fast pace, while the decrease in commuting costs tends to slow down (and
maybe to rise) due to growing congestion and to higher opportunity time cost for urban
residents.
Our concept of equilibrium is standard, while we borrow a dynamics that has been
used in migration analysis (Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou and Thisse, 1985; Tabuchi, 1986;
Zeng, 2000). More precisely, in our model, the incentives to migrate away or toward
a particular region are given by the sum of utility diﬀerentials between this region and
the others. It is well known that proving the existence of a stable equilibrium when
there are more than two regions may be a problematic issue. For example, a limit cycle
may arise. More generally, characterizing the eigenvalues of a nonnumerical system is
often a formidable task. However, our model displays some nice features that allow us
to apply recent stability theorems without having to compute eigenvalues (Tabuchi and
Zeng, 2000). We will see that, under fairly weak conditions, a stable equilibrium always
exists. To the best of our knowledge, such a result has not been proven for the original
core-periphery modeldevel oped by Krugman (1993).
Previewing our main results, we will see that workers will move from small to large
urban regions when the desirability of the diﬀerentiated product rises or when the size of
the agricultural population falls (Proposition 1). Under some regularity conditions, we
then show that the number of workers residing in a region with low urban costs is always
larger than that in a region with high urban costs (Proposition 2). In Section 5, we study
how the size of urban regions changes when trade costs fall. More precisely, we show that
large urban regions grow in the early stages of economic integration but decline in the late
stages (Theorem 1). Unfortunately, we have not been able to characterize the evolution
of the urban regions when trade costs take “intermediate” values. Finally, in Section 6,
we consider the more diﬃcult case of a stable equilibrium in which some regions have no
industrial sector. To this end, we restrict ourselves to linear urban costs. It is then shown
that the number of urban regions keeps decreasing when trade costs decrease from high
values to intermediate values. In this case, the core of the economy is made of a shrinking
3number of regions. However, when trade costs keep decreasing, this process is reversed
and the number of urban regions rise (Theorem 2). In other words, once trade costs are
suﬃciently low, the market solves the congestion problem induced by the agglomeration of
industry in a small number of regions by redistributing ﬁrms and workers among a larger
number of regions. It should be clear that the implications of such results are important
for the formation of integrating economies, such as the European Union or NAFTA.
Although we do not deal with diﬀerential regional growth, it seems fair to say that
our paper contributes to the debate regarding the spatial implications of economic devel-
opment. In the development literature, a high degree of urban concentration is expected
to arise during the early phases of growth. As development proceeds, deconcentration
would occur because the economy can aﬀord to spread infrastructure, while the initial
urban giants become high cost and congested places that are less attractive locations for
producers and workers (Vining and Kontuly, 1978; Alonso, 1980). Since it is reasonable
to interpret the value of internal trade costs as an index of economic development, we
may conclude that our results suggest the existence of such a ∩-shaped relationship be-
tween economic development and the spatial distribution of activities. Interestingly, this
relationship accords with the observations made in some developed economies, according
to which industry would relocate outside the main urban regions (Champion, 1994; Geyer
and Kontuly, 1996).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section
2, while existence and stability of an equilibrium are dealt with in Section 3. Some
preliminary results are shown in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 contain our main results
discussed above, while Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The space-economy is made of n ≥ 2 regions (i =1 ,···,n). Each region has one city
that has a given center but a variable size. As in urban economics, the city center stands
for a central business district (CBD) in which all ﬁrms locate once they have chosen to
set up in the corresponding region (Fujita and Thisse, 1996). The CBDs are given by n
points of the location space.
There are two factors, called A and L. Factor A is evenly distributed across regions
(A/n) and is spatially immobile. The assumption of a uniform distribution of A is made
in order to focus on the impact of diﬀerentialurban costs on the distribution of activities.
Factor L is mobile between any two regions. Let λi ∈ [0,1] denotes its share in region i
4and let
Λ ≡
 
λ =( λ1,···,λ n);
n  
i=1
λi = 1 and λi ≥ 0
 
For expositionalpurposes, we refer to the ﬁrst sector as “agricul ture” and to the second
sector as “manufacturing”. Accordingly, we call “farmers” the immobile factor A and
“workers” the mobile factor L.1 For this reason, we will refer to region accommodating
workers (λi > 0) as urban regions, while regions with no workers (λi = 0) are called rural
regions.
There are three goods in the economy. The ﬁrst good is homogeneous. Consumers have
a positive initial endowment of this good, which is also produced in the agricultural sector
using factor A as the only input under constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
Technology in agriculture requires one unit of A in order to produce one unit of output.
We assume that this good can be traded freely between regions so that its price is the
same across regions. Hence this good is chosen as the num´ eraire. As a result, farmers’
income is equalto one in al lregions. 2
The second good is a horizontally diﬀerentiated product; it is supplied by using L as the
only input under increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Technology
in manufacturing requires φ units of L in order to produce any amount of a variety,
i.e. the marginalcost of production of a variety is set equalto zero. Each ﬁrm in the
manufacturing sector has a negligible impact on the market outcome in the sense that it
can ignore its inﬂuence on, and hence reactions from, other ﬁrms. To this end, we assume
that there is a continuum of potentialﬁrms. There are no scope economies so that, due to
increasing returns to scale, there is a one-to-one relationship between ﬁrms and varieties.
Clearly, regardless of the regional distribution of ﬁrms and the value of trade costs, the
totalnumber of ﬁrms in the whol e economy is given by N = L/φ, which is assumed to
be larger than 1. Although this might seem restrictive at ﬁrst sight, this property allows
us to focus on the spatialredistribution of industry per se.
Because each ﬁrm sells a diﬀerentiated variety, it faces a downward sloping demand.
Since there is a continuum of ﬁrms, each one is negligible and the interaction between any
two ﬁrms is zero. However, as will be seen below, aggregate market conditions of some
1We want to stress the fact, however, that the role of factor A is to capture the idea that some inputs
(such as land or some services) are nontradable while some others have a very low spatial mobility (such
as low-skilled workers). For example, the ﬁrst sector could be reinterpreted as the traditional one and
the second sector as the modern one.
2Recall that the choice of the num´ eraire is a diﬃcult issue in general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition.
5kind aﬀects any single ﬁrm. This provides a setting in which individual ﬁrms are not
competitive (in the classic economic sense of having inﬁnite demand elasticity) but, at
the same time, have no strategic interactions with one another. Finally, interregional trade
ﬂows go from one CBD to another. As discussed in the introduction, the corresponding
trade costs are assumed to be identicalbetween any two regions:
τij =



τ>0 for i  = j
0 for i = j
Thus, each variety can be traded at a positive cost of τ units of the num´ eraire for each
unit carried from one region to another, regardless of the variety, τ accounting for all the
impediments to trade. The underlying geography is simple: the n regions are located
along a circumference, while shipping a good from one region to another involves going
through the center of the circumference.
Housing is the third good in our economy. When they live in a certain region, workers
are urban residents who use housing and commute to the regionalCBD where they work.
To keep things simple, all the urban costs borne by a worker who chooses to reside in
region i (land rents, commuting and congestion costs, pollution) are subsumed in a cost
function θi(λi), which varies with the size of the corresponding population of workers.
This function is assumed to satisfy the following properties:
θi(0) = 0 θi(1) < ∞ θ
 
i(y) ≥ 0 i =1 ,···,n and y ∈ [0,1]
Unlike trade costs that are the same between any pair of regions, urban costs are region-
speciﬁc, reﬂecting the fact that living conditions may vastly diﬀer across urban regions
for the same population size (because of natural amenities, better transport facilities or
local public services).
Preferences over the ﬁrst two goods are identicalacross individual s and described by
a quasi-linear utility with a quadratic subutility, which is supposed to be symmetric in
all varieties:
U(q0;q(x),x ∈ [0,N]) = α
  N
0
q(x)dx −
β − γ
2
  N
0
[q(x)]
2dx (1)
−
γ
2
   N
0
q(x)dx
 2
+ q0
where q(x) is the quantity of variety x ∈ [0,N] and q0 the quantity of the num´ eraire. The
parameters in (1) are such that α>0 and β>γ>0. In this expression, α expresses
the intensity of preferences for the diﬀerentiated product, whereas β>γmeans that
consumers are biased toward a dispersed consumption of varieties (varietas delectat).
6If the consumption of the homogeneous good is positive, maximizing (1) under the
budget constraint
  N
0
p(x)q(x)dx + q0 = wi + q0 − θi(λi) (2)
(where wi denotes the wage prevailing in region i and q0 is the initialendowment of the
num´ eraire) yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
α − (β − γ)q(x) − γ
  N
0
q(y)dy = p(x) x ∈ [0,N]
or
q(x)=a − (b + cN)p(x)+c
  N
0
p(y)dy x ∈ [0,N] (3)
where
a ≡
α
β +( N − 1)γ
b ≡
1
β +( N − 1)γ
c ≡
γ
(β − γ)[β +( N − 1)γ]
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), we obtain the indirect utility of a worker residing in
this region:
Vi =
a2N
2b
− a
  N
0
p(x)dx +
b + cN
2
  N
0
[p(x)]
2dx −
c
2
   N
0
p(x)dx
 2
+ q0
+wi − θi(λi) (4)
In accord with empirical evidence (Head and Mayer, 2000; McCallum, 1995), we as-
sume that markets are regionally segmented so that each ﬁrm chooses a delivered price
which is speciﬁc to the region in which its variety is sold. Let pij(x) be the price of variety
x produced in region i and sold in region j, and qij(x) the demand in region j for variety x
produced in region i. To ease the burden of notation, we drop x hereafter. Consequently,
operating proﬁts of a ﬁrm established in region i can be written as
Πi(λ)=
n  
j=1
(pij − δijτ)qij
 
A
n
+ λjL
 
where δij = 1 when i  = j and 0 otherwise. We assume throughout this paper that trade
costs are such that it is always proﬁtable for any ﬁrm to export from one region to another.
7As to equilibrium wages, they are determined as follows. First, by maximizing ﬁrms’
proﬁts with respect to prices, we obtain3
pii =
2a + cτ(1 − λi)N
2(2b + cN)
pji = pii +
τ
2
for i  = j
qii = a − (b + cN)pii + cN
n  
k=1
λkpki =( b + cN)pii
qji = a − (b + cN)pji + cN
n  
k=1
λkpki =( b + cN)(pji − τ) for i  = j
Second, due to free entry and exit, proﬁts net of ﬁxed costs are zero in equilibrium. As
in Krugman (1991), the equilibrium wages are determined by a bidding process between
ﬁrms for workers, which ends when no ﬁrm can earn a strictly positive proﬁt at the
equilibrium market prices. In other words, all operating proﬁts are absorbed by the wage
bills. Hence, the wage prevailing in region i is determined as follows:
wi(λ)=
Πi
φ
=
1
φ
n  
j=1
(pij − δijτ)qij
 
A
n
+ λjL
 
=
(b + cN)N
L
n  
j=1
 
pjj −
δijτ
2
 2  
A
n
+ λjL
 
=
(b + cN)N
L
 
n  
j =i
 
pjj −
τ
2
 2  
A
n
+ λjL
 
+ p
2
ii
 
A
n
+ λiL
  
=
(b + cN)N
L
 
n  
j=1
 
pjj −
τ
2
 2  
A
n
+ λjL
 
+
 
piiτ −
τ2
4
  
A
n
+ λiL
  
3It is reasonable to assume that each ﬁrm’s demand is decreasing in the total number of varieties
because consumers spread their purchases over more varieties. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to
assume that a consumer’s demand for the diﬀerentiated product increases with N because more varieties
makes this good more attractive compared to the num´ eraire. Computing the partial derivatives of the
above demand function, we immediately see that ∂qii/∂N < 0 and ∂(qiiN)/∂N > 0.
8Accordingly, the indirect utility of a worker living in region i can be computed as follows:
Vi(λ)=
a2N
2b
− a
n  
j=1
λjNpji +
b + cN
2
n  
k=1
λjNp
2
ji −
c
2
 
n  
j=1
λjNpji
 2
+q0 + wi − θi(λi)
=
a2N
2b
− aN
 
pii +
τ(1 − λi)
2
 
+
(b + cN)N
2
 
p
2
ii +( 1− λi)τ
 
pii +
τ
4
  
−
cN2
2
 
pii +
τ(1 − λi)
2
 2
+
(b + cN)N
L
 
n  
j=1
 
pjj −
τ
2
 2  
A
n
+ λjL
 
+τ
 
pii −
τ
4
  
A
n
+ λiL
  
+ q0 − θi(λi) (5)
As expected, the indirect utility Vi(λ) depends on the whole distribution λ.
3 Existence and stability ofa spatial equilibrium
We now move to the deﬁnition and the stability of a spatial equilibrium. The distribution
λ∗ ∈ Λi saspatial equilibrium when no worker may get a higher utility level by moving
to another region. Formally, a distribution λ∗ is an equilibrium if V ∗ exists such that
Vi(λ∗)=V ∗ if λ∗
i > 0
Vi(λ∗) ≤ V ∗ if λ∗
i =0
(6)
In words, this means that, in equilibrium, workers’ utility in urban regions is (weakly)
higher than in rural regions, while the utility level is constant across urban regions. Since
Vi(λ) is continuous in λ ∈ Λ as shown by (5), Proposition 1 of Ginsburgh et al. (1985)
implies that a spatial equilibrium exists.
In order to study the stability of a spatial equilibrium, we assume that local labor
markets adjust instantaneously when some workers move from one region to the other.
More precisely, wages are adjusted in each region for each ﬁrm located therein to earn
zero proﬁts. Hence, during the adjustment process, the utility level of a worker residing
in region i is given by Vi(λ).
The above spatial equilibrium conditions turn out to be equivalent to the following
zero migration conditions:
dλji(t) = 0 for all j,i =1 ,...,n (7)
where dλji(t) is the (net) migration from region j to region i during the inﬁnitesimaltime
interval dt at time t. Following a now well-established tradition in migration modeling, we
9focus on an adjustment process in which workers spread themselves among several regions,
being attracted (repulsed) by regions providing high (low) utility levels. In particular, we
assume that migration dλji is proportional to the utility diﬀerence if population in region
j is positive. Then, the dynamicalsystem of equations is such as
dλi
dt
≡
n  
j=1
dλji
dt
for i =1 ,...,n (8)
where the speed of adjustment has been normalized to one, and where
dλji
dt
≡

      
      
Vi(λ) − Vj(λ)i f λi > 0,λ j > 0
min{0,V i(λ) − Vj(λ)} if λi > 0,λ j =0
max{0,V i(λ) − Vj(λ)} if λi =0 ,λ j > 0
0i f λi =0 ,λ j =0
It is readily veriﬁed that
 n
i=1 dλi/dt = 0 since the totalpopul ation of workers remains
constant during the adjustment process. This dynamics can be justiﬁed by the assumption
that migration decisions are made on the basis of pairwise comparisons between regions in
that the net migration from region j to region i is proportionalto their util ity diﬀerential
Vi−Vj if population in region j is positive. As a consequence, the sum of the net migration
ﬂows of region i is such that
dλi
dt
=
n  
j=1
[Vi(λ) − Vj(λ)] = n
 
Vi(λ) −
1
n
n  
j=1
Vj(λ)
 
(9)
if population in region j is positive. Expression (9) also means that regions with a
utility level higher (lower) than the average level across regions have a growing (declining)
population of workers (and ﬁrms).4
4Observe that (9) bears some resemblance with Weibull’s (1995) replicator dynamics used recently by
Fujita et al. (1999): dλi/dt =[ Vi(λ) −
 n
j=1 λjVj(λ)]λi. The two dynamics yield identical stationary
states since they both solve (6). Furthermore, the stability conditions of equilibrium in both dynamics
turn out to be the same as (12) and (13) as shown by Tabuchi and Zeng (2000). There are diﬀerences,
however. Workers out-migrate (in-migrate) from region i if its utility Vi is lower (higher) than the
interregional weighted average utility in the replicator dynamics whereas workers out-migrate (in-migrate)
if Vi is lower than the interregional unweighted average utility in ours. By using the replicator, one makes
the regions with high utility even more attractive, thus aﬀecting the pace of adjustment.. Yet, (9) is
simpler to handle because it does not involve any crossed term λiλj (i,j =1 ,...,nand i  = j) and leads
to analytical results.
10In order to study the stability of a spatial equilibrium, we must evaluate the sum of
the pairwise utility diﬀerentials used in (9). To this end, we set
Si(λi) ≡ (C1τ − C2τ
2)λi − C3τ
2λ
2
i − θi(λi)
where
C1 ≡
aN(b + cN)(3b +2 cN)
(2b + cN)2
C2 ≡
N(b + cN)
8(2b + cN)2
 
4(2b + cN)
cNA
nL
+1 2 b
2 +4 bcN − 3c
2N
2
 
C3 ≡
cN2(b + cN)(8b +5 cN)
8(2b + cN)2
It is readily veriﬁed that C1 > 0, C3 > 0, C2 + C3 > 0. However, C2 may be negative
when c is very large, namely when varieties are very close substitutes. Throughout the
rest of paper, we will assume that the product is suﬃciently diﬀerentiated for C2 to be
positive. This entails very little loss of generality. Clearly, Si(0) = 0.
Unlike Vi(λ) that depends on the whole distribution λ, the function Si(λi) depends
only upon the size of region i. In addition, the following lemma will allow us to use Si(λi)
instead of Vi(λ) in the stability analysis of equilibria. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 For i =1 ,···,n, we have:
n  
j=1
[Vi(λ) − Vj(λ)] =
n  
j=1
[Si(λi) − Sj(λj)] (10)
Hence, the RHS of (10) is additively separable with respect to the λi’s, i.e., there are
no crossed terms λiλj with i  = j. This lemma implies that
Vi(λ) −
1
n
n  
j=1
Vj(λ)=Si(λi) −
1
n
n  
j=1
Sj(λj) i =1 ,...,n
For a given distribution λ, this means region i yields a welfare level higher (lower) than
the average welfare if and only if Si(λi) is larger (smaller) than the average value of the
Sj(λj)’s. Hence, the migration equation (9) becomes
dλi
dt
= n
 
Si(λi) −
1
n
n  
j=1
Sj(λj)
 
thus making the stability analysis much simpler. From now on, we refer to Si(λi) as the
“pseudo-surplus” of region i. This function may be used to study the properties of an
11equilibrium. If λ∗ is a spatialequil ibrium with m ≤ n urban regions ij (j =1 ,...,m)
then it must be that
Si1(λ∗
i1)=···= Sim−1(λ∗
im−1)=Sim(λ∗
im)i fλ∗
ij > 0
Sij(λ∗
ij)=0 i f λ∗
ij =0
(11)
and conversely. So, (6) and (11) are equivalent. Although Si(0) = 0, observe that
there may exist an equilibrium at which all the pseudo-surpluses are negative and equal.
However, if the equilibrium involves at least one rural region, the pseudo-surpluses of all
urban regions are nonnegative and equal.
Consider an equilibrium with m urban regions such that
S
 
i1(λ
∗
i1) ≤···≤S
 
im−1(λ
∗
im−1) ≤ S
 
im(λ
∗
im)
When m<n , Tabuchi and Zeng (2000) show that λ∗ is (locally) stable if the following
two conditions hold:
S 
im−1(λ∗
im−1) < 0 and
 m−1
j=1
S 
im(λ∗
im)
S 
ij(λ∗
ij) > −1 (12)
Sij(λ∗
ij) > 0 j =1 ,···,m (13)
When the manufacturing sector is concentrated into a single region (m = 1), these two
conditions boildown to S1(1) > 0. Furthermore, when m = n, the sole condition (12)
ensures stability. Finally, the equilibrium is unstable when the second inequality in (12)
is reversed.5
4 On the size ofregions
It turns out to be possible to ﬁgure out how the size of urban regions is aﬀected by an
increase in the desirability of the industrial good or by a decrease in the number of farm-
ers, two trends that have characterized the evolution of developed economies since the
beginning of the IndustrialRevol ution. Let m be the number of regions with manufac-
turing workers. We may then predict the directions of migration between large and small
regions as follows.
Proposition 1 When the desirability of the diﬀerentiated good (α) rises or when the
agricultural population (A) falls, workers migrate from regions whose industrial share is
smaller than the average (1/m) to large regions whose industrial share is larger than the
average.
5When the second inequality in (12) becomes an equality, the equilibrium may be stable or unstable.
12Proof. Assume ﬁrst that α increases up to ˆ α. From the deﬁnition of Si, it follows that
C2 and C3 are unchanged while a increases up to ˆ a = aˆ α/α so that C1 increases up to
ˆ C1 ≡ C1ˆ α/α. Set
ˆ Si(λi) ≡ ( ˆ C1τ − C2τ
2)λi − C3τ
2λ
2
i − θi(λi) i =1 ,...,m
Since λ∗ is an equilibrium, we have
m  
j=1
[ˆ Si(λ
∗
i) − ˆ Sj(λ
∗
j)] =
m  
j=1
[ˆ Si(λ
∗
i) − ˆ Sj(λ
∗
j) − Si(λ
∗
i)+Sj(λ
∗
j)]
=
m  
j=1
[( ˆ C1 − C1)τλ
∗
i − ( ˆ C1 − C1)τλ
∗
j]
=( ˆ C1 − C1)τ
m  
j=1
(λ
∗
i − λ
∗
j)=(ˆ C1 − C1)τ(mλ
∗
i − 1)
Therefore, when α increases, dλi/dt has the same sign as mλ∗
i − 1, thus implying that
large regions become larger while small regions become smaller.
Similarly, when A decreases, C2 decreases while C1 and C3 remain unchanged. Hence
the conclusion follows.    
Hence, a stronger preference for the diﬀerentiated product as well as a smaller popu-
lation of farmers fosters a higher level of geographical concentration of the manufacturing
sector. Unfortunately, the eﬀects of other parameters’ change are ambiguous.
Let us re-index for the moment the regions as follows:
λ
∗
i > 0 for i =1 ,...,m and λ
∗
j = 0 for j = m +1 ,...,n
Since λ∗ is a stable equilibrium, we know from the stability condition (12) that at most
one expression S 
i is nonnegative, all the others being negative.
Deﬁnition 1 The spatial equilibrium λ
∗ is said to be regular if S 
i(λ∗
i) < 0 for i =
1,...,m; otherwise, it is called irregular.
Clearly, any regular equilibrium is stable. The next result states some suﬃcient conditions
allowing us to rank regions in terms of the size of their manufacturing sector in the case
of a regular spatial equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Consider a regular equilibrium λ
∗ =( λ∗
1,...,λ ∗
i,...,λ ∗
n). If the urban
costs are convex and if θi(y) ≤ θj(y) for some i,j ∈{ 1,...,n}, then we have λ∗
i ≥ λ∗
j.
Furthermore, λ∗
i = λ∗
j > 0 implies that θi(λ∗
i)=θj(λ∗
j).
13Proof: (i) The statement is obvious for i = m+1,...,nsince λ∗
i = 0. Let i ∈{ 1,...,m}
and assume that θi(λ∗
i) ≤ θj(λ∗
j) while λ∗
j >λ ∗
i holds for some j ∈{ 1,...,n}. Then, it
must be that λ∗
j > 0 so that j ∈{ 1,...,m}. Since the equilibrium is regular, we have
C1τ − C2τ
2 < 2C3τ
2λ
∗
i + θ
 
i(λ
∗
i) i =1 ,...,m (14)
Furthermore, since λ∗ is an equilibrium while both λ∗
i and λ∗
j are strictly positive, we have
Si(λ∗
i)=Sj(λ∗
j) so that
C1τ − C2τ
2 = C3τ
2(λ
∗
i + λ
∗
j)+
θj(λ∗
j) − θi(λ∗
i)
λ∗
j − λ∗
i
(15)
Combining (14) and (15), we get
C3τ
2(λ
∗
j − λ
∗
i)+
θj(λ∗
j) − θi(λ∗
i)
λ∗
j − λ∗
i
<θ
 
i(λ
∗
i)
Then, the mean value theorem implies that ξ ∈ [λ∗
i,λ ∗
j] exists such that
C3τ
2(λ
∗
j − λ
∗
i)+
θj(λ∗
j) − θi(λ∗
j)
λ∗
j − λ∗
i
+ θ
 
i(ξ) <θ
 
i(λ
∗
i) (16)
Because θi(·) is convex, we have θ 
i(ξ) ≥ θ 
i(λ∗
i). Furthermore, since θj(λ∗
j) − θi(λ∗
j) ≥ 0,
C3 > 0 and λ∗
j − λ∗
i > 0, we obtain
C3τ
2(λ
∗
j − λ
∗
i)+
θj(λ∗
j) − θi(λ∗
j)
λ∗
j − λ∗
i
+ θ
 
i(ξ) >θ
 
i(λ
∗
i)
thus contradicting (16). Accordingly, we have λ∗
i ≥ λ∗
j.
(ii) Using Si(λ∗
i)=Sj(λ∗
j) and the deﬁnition of Si(λi), it is readily veriﬁed that
λ∗
i = λ∗
j > 0 implies that θi(λ∗
i)=θj(λ∗
j).    
The assumption of convex urban costs has been shown to hold under fairly general
conditions in urban economics (Fujita, 1989, p.145). The regular equilibrium condition
S 
i(λ∗
i) < 0( i =1 ,...,m) is more demanding, but it constitutes a simple suﬃcient
condition for stability. Under these two assumptions, the proposition above says that,
regardless of the value of τ, regions with low (high) urban costs always have a large (small)
share of the industrial sector. In other words, regions with poorer urban infrastructure
attract less ﬁrms from the industrial sector, although workers’ welfare is the same in all
urban regions (i =1 ,...,m). By contrast, farmers enjoy a lower welfare level in regions
having poor urban infrastructure than those living in regions having good infrastructure
because the former regions accommodate less ﬁrms and, therefore, produce fewer varieties
than the latter.
145 The eﬀect ofdecreasing trade costs
In this section, we focus on the case in which all regions are urban and study how their
size is aﬀected by decreasing trade costs. To this end, it is convenient to renumber the
regions as follows:
S
 
1(λ
∗
1) ≤···≤S
 
n−1(λ
∗
n−1) ≤ S
 
n(λ
∗
n)
Since λ∗ is a stable equilibrium, we know from the stability condition (12) that, while
the sign of S 
n may be positive, zero or negative, all the other S 
i (i =1 ,...,n− 1) must
be negative.
When trade costs are given by τ, we denote the corresponding interior equilibrium by
λ
∗(τ)=( λ
∗
1(τ),...,λ
∗
n(τ))
with λ∗
i(τ) > 0. Assume that (12) holds so that λ
∗(τ) is stable for each τ. Since
 n
k=1λ∗
k(τ) = 1, it must be that
dλ∗
n(τ)
dτ
= −
n−1  
k=1
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
(17)
Since Si(λi) is also a function of τ, we may denote it as Si(λi,τ). For convenience, we
also set
S
 
i ≡
∂Si(λi,τ)
∂λi
 
 
 
 
λi=λ∗
i
zi ≡
n  
j=1
∂(Si − Sj)
∂τ
=( C1 − 2C2τ)(nλ
∗
i − 1) − 2C3τ
 
n(λ
∗
i)
2 −
n  
j=1
(λ
∗
j)
2
 
(18)
In equilibrium, it must be that
 n
j=1[Si(λ∗
i(τ),τ) − Sj(λ∗
j(τ),τ)] = 0. Diﬀerentiat-
ing this equation yields the following system of linear equations whose unknowns are
dλ∗
i(τ)/dτ:
−(n − 1)S
 
i
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
+
n  
j =1
j  = i
S
 
j
dλ∗
j(τ)
dτ
= zi i =1 ,...,n (19)
Let
D =


 


−(n − 1)S 
1 − S 
n S 
2 − S 
n ··· S 
n−1 − S 
n
S 
1 − S 
n −(n − 1)S 
2 − S 
n ··· S 
n−1 − S 
n
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
S 
1 − S 
n S 
2 − S 
n ··· −(n − 1)S 
n−1 − S 
n


 


15and Di be the matrix obtained from D by replacing the i-th column with



 

z1
z2
. . .
zn−1



 

=( C1 − 2C2τ)



 

nλ∗
1 − 1
nλ∗
2 − 1
. . .
nλ∗
n−1 − 1



 

− 2C3τ

 
 
 


n(λ∗
1)2 −
 n
j=1
 
λ∗
j
 2
n(λ∗
2)2 −
 n
j=1
 
λ∗
j
 2
. . .
n(λ∗
n−1)2 −
 n
j=1
 
λ∗
j
 2

 
 
 


Using (17), it is readily veriﬁed that the solution to the system (19) is given by
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
=
|Di|
|D|
i =1 ,...,n− 1 (20)
where |Di| (respectively |D|) is the determinant of the matrix Di (respectively D).
Next, we may establish the following result which will be useful in studying the evo-
lution of the industry distribution.
Lemma 2 If (12) holds at equilibrium λ
∗, then
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
=
1
n2|D|
n  
k =1
k  = i
(−nS
 
k)
 
n  
k=1
zi − zk
(−S 
k)
 
i =1 ,...,n (21)
The proof is given in Appendix C.
We can now sketch the idea underlying the results that will be proven below. The last
term of (21) may be rewritten as follows:6
zi − zk
−S 
k
=
n
∂(Si−Sk)
∂τ
−S 
k
= n
∂(Si−Sk)
∂τ
∂(Si−Sk)
∂λk
(22)
In order to understand the meaning of this expression, we ﬁx λi and consider the impact
on λk of a change in τ, while keeping the equilibrium condition Si = Sk. Then, we have
−
dλk(τ)
dτ
= −
∂(Si−Sk)
∂τ
∂Sk
∂λk
=
∂(Si−Sk)
∂τ
∂(Si−Sk)
∂λk
so that the third expression in (22) measures the marginalimpact of τ on λk (up to n).
Therefore, if (22) is negative, region k experiences net in-migration from region i at a
regular equilibrium with S 
i < 0 for all i =1 ,···,n.
6Recall that Si (resp. Sk) depends on τ and λi (resp. τ and λk).
16Since the population of workers is ﬁxed, when some regions become larger due to
the change in trade costs, some others must become smaller. Among the regions that
experience a decreasing population, let h be the region with the largest increase (or
smallest decrease) in the equilibrium utility level. On the other hand, among the regions
whose population rises, let l be the region with the smallest increase (or largest decrease) in
the equilibrium utility level. Finally, let region e be a region with unchanging population
size. Formally, we have:

       
       
zh = min
i
 
∂Si
∂τ
;
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
> 0
 
dλ∗
e(τ)
dτ
=0
zl = max
i
 
∂Si
∂τ
;
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
< 0
 
(23)
Note that regions h,e,l may not exist simultaneously, but at least one of them does. By
construction, a decrease in τ induces migration from region h to region l, implying that
utility is higher in region l. That is, ∂(Sl − Sh)/∂τ < 0, a result that is consistent with
the fact that zh >z l.
Consider now a regular equilibrium. Then, in (21), the sign of a change in λ∗
i(τ)i s
determined by the sign of
 n
k=1(zi −zk)/(−S 
k). From (18), it follows that each zi −zk in
(21) is given by
n(λ
∗
i − λ
∗
k){C1 − 2[C2 + C3(λ
∗
i + λ
∗
k)]τ}
Hence, when trade costs are high (τ>C 1/2[C2 + C3(λ∗
i + λ∗
k)]), a decrease in τ makes
larger regions (λ∗
i >λ ∗
k) larger, while smaller regions (λ∗
i <λ ∗
k) become smaller.B y
contrast, when trade costs are low (τ<C 1/2[C2 + C3(λ∗
i + λ∗
k)]), the opposite holds.
This argument is developed in a more systematic way in what follows. For analytical
simplicity, in the remainder of this section we consider asymmetric equilibria in which
there exist regions i,j such that λ∗
i  = λ∗
j. Furthermore, we assume
τ  =
C1
2C2 +2 C3(λ∗
i + λ∗
j)
for all i,j =1 ,...,nand i  = j (24)
Therefore, there exist regions i and j such that zi  = zj. Condition (24) excludes only a
ﬁnite number of values of τ out of a continuum. This does not induce any signiﬁcant loss
of generality.
Three types of interior equilibria may emerge according to the sign of S 
n. In Figure
1a, a regular equilibrium in which S 
n < 0 is represented. The cases of irregular equilibria
17with S 
n = 0 and S 
n > 0 are depicted in Figures 1b and 1c, respectively. In what follows,
each case is discussed in order.
Figure 1: Regular and irregular equilibria with urban regions
5.1 Regular equilibrium (S 
n < 0)
In the case of a regular equilibrium, Lemma 2 allows us to rewrite (23) as follows:

        
        
zh = min
 
zi;
n  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
> 0
 
n  
k=1
ze − zk
−S 
k
=0
zl = max
 
zi;
n  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
< 0
 
(25)
By deﬁnition, zh >z e >z l. Region e may not exist. However, both regions h and l do
exist in any regular equilibrium as shown by Lemma D in Appendix. In what follows, we
use the following deﬁnition of “large” and “small” regions.
Deﬁnition 2 Region i is said to be large if λ∗
i ≥ max{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h} and small if λ∗
i ≤
min{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h} for i  = l,e,h. When max{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h} >λ ∗
i > min{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h}, the region
is called medium.
Since we consider asymmetric equilibria, both region h and region l exist by Lemma
E in Appendix and, hence, large and small regions exist. Let
τih ≡
C1
2[C2 + C3(λ∗
i + min{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h})]
(26)
τil ≡
C1
2[C2 + C3(λ∗
i + max{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h})]
(27)
for i =1 ,···,n, where λ∗
e is deleted when region e does not exist. Clearly, we have
τil ≤ τih; the larger λ∗
i, the smaller τih and τil. Although τil ≤ τjl and τih ≤ τjh when
λ∗
i >λ ∗
j > 0, it is not possible to rank τjl and τih.
We have:
Lemma 3 Consider any asymmetric regular equilibrium. If i  = e, we have:
(i) when τ>τ ih, large regions become larger while small regions become smaller;
(ii) when τ<τ il, large regions become smaller while small regions become larger.
18Proof: From Lemmas D and E as well as from Deﬁnition 2, exactly one of the following
two cases applies to a large region or a small region. First, zi ≥ zh is equivalent to
(λ
∗
i − λ
∗
h)[C1 − 2C2τ − 2C3τ(λ
∗
i + λ
∗
h)] ≥ 0 (28)
Second, zi ≤ zl is equivalent to
(λ
∗
i − λ
∗
l)[C1 − 2C2τ − 2C3τ(λ
∗
i + λ
∗
l)] ≤ 0 (29)
Consider now the situation in which τ>τ ih. We have
C1 − 2C2τ − 2C3τ(λ
∗
i + λ
∗
l) ≤ C1 − 2[C2 + C3τ(λ
∗
i + min{λ
∗
l,λ
∗
e,λ
∗
h})] < 0
In a large region i with λ∗
i ≥ λ∗
l, (29) holds, and hence zi ≤ zl. This implies that region i
becomes larger by Lemma D. Similarly, in a small region i with λ∗
i <λ ∗
l, (28) holds, and
hence zi ≥ zh, implying that region i becomes smaller.
When τ<τ il, we can similarly show that a large region becomes smaller while a small
region becomes larger.    
Assume that τ decreases from some large threshold τ.First, let i be any large region.
Since τih is inversely related to λ∗
i, the larger the regional size of i, the larger the interval
[τih,τ] for which the size of region i necessarily expands. By contrast, since τil is inversely
related to λ∗
i, the larger the regional size, the smaller the interval [0,τ il] of trade costs for
which the regional size must shrink. When τ ∈ (τil,τ ih), we do not know how the size of
region i evolves. For example, as shown by the analysis of the two-region case, the whole
manufacturing sector may agglomerate into a single region (Ottaviano et al., 2001). The
reason for the existence of the domain (τil,τ ih) lies in the fact that some regions may
become ruralwhen τ falls in this interval. This explains why the previous analysis cannot
cover the whole domain of τ-values.
Second, consider any small region i.A sτ decreases from τ, the size of region i must
decrease up to τ = τih. Below τil, this region recoups some ﬁrms/workers and keeps
growing as τ falls. Again, for the same reason as in the case of large regions, we do not
know how a small region changes when τ ∈ (τil,τ ih).
Last, for a medium region, the evolution of its size as trade costs fall is undetermined.
195.2 Irregular equilibrium (S 
n =0 )
In this case, we rewrite (21) as follows.

     
     
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
=
1
n2|D|
n−1  
k=1
(−nS
 
k)
zi − zn
−S 
i
for i =1 ,...,n− 1
dλ∗
n(τ)
dτ
=
1
n2|D|
n−1  
k=1
(−nS
 
k)
n−1  
k=1
zn − zk
−S 
k
(30)
The expression for region n in (30) is the same as that in (21), whereas the expression
for region i  = n is diﬀerent from that in (21). In this case, we cannot use (22) anymore
since S 
n = 0. However, we can proceed as follows:
zi − zn
−S 
i
= −n
∂(Sn−Si)
∂τ
∂(Sn−Si)
∂λi
,i =1 ,...,n− 1
which slightly diﬀers from (22).
The ﬁrst equation of (30) implies that region n plays a role similar to that of regions
l,e,h. That is, the changes in regions i =1 ,···,n−1 are determined only by the sign of
zi − zn. As a result, (26) and (27) reduce to
τih = τil =
C1
2[C2 + C3(λ∗
i + λ∗
n)]
≡ τin
For the same reason as before, i is a large region if λ∗
i >λ ∗
n and a small region if λ∗
i <λ ∗
n.
On the other hand, whether region n is large or small is determined by regions l,e,h
redeﬁned as follows:

         
         
zh = min
 
zi;i<n ,
n−1  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
> 0
 
e<n ,
n−1  
k=1
ze − zk
−S 
k
=0
zl = max
 
zi;i<n ,
n−1  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
< 0
 
(31)
Comparing with the regular equilibrium case, the new deﬁnitions exclude region n. With
these new deﬁnitions of h, e and l, τnh and τnl are the same as in (26) and (27) respectively.
Hence, Deﬁnition 2 is valid for region n.
If zn ≥ zk (k =1 ,...,n−1) while at least one inequality is strict, then dλ∗
n(τ)/dτ > 0
and, hence, region n becomes smaller. If zn ≤ zk (k =1 ,...,n− 1), and at least one
20inequality is strict, then dλ∗
n(τ)/dτ < 0 and, hence, region n becomes larger. Otherwise,
there exist two regions i∗, j∗ ∈{ 1,...,n− 1} such that
min{zk;k =1 ,...,n} = zj∗ <z n <z i∗ = max{zk;k =1 ,...,n}
Then,
n−1  
k=1
zi∗ − zk
−S 
k
> 0 and
n−1  
k=1
zj∗ − zk
−S 
k
< 0
hold, implying that regions h and l exist. In this case, we have the following result.
Lemma 4 The statements of Lemma 3 hold for all regions i =1 ,...,nat any irregular
equilibrium such that S 
n =0provided that
τih = τil = τin for i =1 ,...,n− 1
τnh =
C1
2C2 +2 C3(λ∗
n + min{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h})
τnl =
C1
2C2 +2 C3(λ∗
n + max{λ∗
l,λ ∗
e,λ ∗
h})
where regions h, e and l are deﬁned by (31).
5.3 Irregular equilibrium (S 
n > 0)
We redeﬁne regions h, e and l as follows:

        
        
zh = min
 
zi;i<n ,
n  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
< 0
 
e<n ,
n  
k=1
ze − zk
−S 
k
=0
zl = max
 
zi;i<n ,
n  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
> 0
 
By comparison with the other two cases, the inequalities of the summations are reverse.
This is because the sum in (21) is multiplied by a negative term (−nS 
n). However, since
zh is still given by (23), regions h and l can be re-interpreted as in the regular equilibrium
case.
From S 
n > 0, the stability condition (12) now becomes
 n
k=11/(−S 
k) < 0. Therefore,
if zi ≥ zh for region i  = n, we have
n  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
=( zi − zh)
n  
k=1
1
−S 
k
+
n  
k=1
zh − zk
−S 
k
< 0
21This implies that dλ∗
i(τ)/dτ > 0 and, hence, region i becomes smaller. Similarly, we
can show that region i  = n with zi ≤ zl becomes larger. For region n, the conclusion is
opposite because of the negative sign of S 
n > 0. That is, region n becomes larger when
zn ≥ zh, and region n becomes smaller when zn ≤ zl.
It should be noticed that region h or region l exists at an asymmetric equilibrium, but
the regions may not exist simultaneously. Nevertheless, we obtain the same results as in
Lemma 3, except for region n.
Lemma 5 At any irregular equilibrium with S 
n > 0,
(a) Lemma 3 holds for regions i =1 ,···,n− 1
(b) The opposite results of Lemma 3 hold for region n.
Proof: (a1) If h exists but l does not exist, then zi ≥ zh holds for all i  = n,o r
(λ
∗
i − λ
∗
h)[C1 − 2C2τ − 2C3τ(λ
∗
i + λ
∗
h)] ≥ 0
This is equivalent to
τ>
C1
2C2 +2 C3(λ∗
i + λ∗
h)
and λ
∗
i ≤ λ
∗
h (32)
τ<
C1
2C2 +2 C3(λ∗
i + λ∗
h)
and λ
∗
i ≥ λ
∗
h (33)
Condition (32) means that a small region with λ∗
i ≤ λ∗
h becomes smaller, which corre-
sponds to the latter part of Lemma 3 (i).
On the other hand, (33) implies that a large region with λ∗
i ≥ λ∗
h becomes smaller,
which is the former part of Lemma 3 (ii).
(a2) If l exists but h does not exist, we can similarly show that the former part of
Lemma 3 (i) and the latter part of Lemma 3 (ii).
(a3) If both regions h and l exist and if τ>τ nh, then C1 − 2C2 − 2C3τ(λ∗
n + λ∗
l) < 0.
If region i is large, (λ∗
i − λ∗
l)[C1 − 2C2 − 2C3τ(λ∗
n + λ∗
l)] < 0 holds, and hence, zi <z l.
That is, region i  = n becomes larger. The other part can be shown in a similar way.
(b) The opposite results for region n can be shown similarly.    
5.4 Dispersion/agglomeration/re-dispersion
Putting together Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 while using the inequalities τih ≤ C1/2C2 as well as
τil ≥ C1/2(C2 + C3), we obtain the following result.
22Theorem 1 Assume that trade costs fall and disregard the ﬁnite number of values of τ
given by (24). If S 
n ≤ 0, then large regions become larger and small regions become smaller
as long as τ>C 1/2C2, while large regions become smaller and small regions become larger
once τ<C 1/2(C2+C3). Furthermore, when S 
n > 0, the direction of migration is reverse
for at most one region.
This theorem has severalinteresting impl ications. First, when trade costs are high
(τ>C 1/2C2), their decrease triggers an agglomeration process in which each large region
attracts workers and ﬁrms from the small regions which shrink. By contrast, when trade
costs are small (τ<C 1/2(C2 + C3)), the large regions lose workers and ﬁrms while the
small regions grow. Hence, agglomeration takes place in the early stages of economic
integration, while re-dispersion should occur in the late stages of the economic integration
process.
In order to show the importance of ﬁxed costs for this process, it is worth noting that
the interval[ C1/2(C2 + C3),C 1/2C2] collapses at a single value zero when φ = 0. Since
C1/2(C2 + C3) ≤ τil ≤ τih ≤ C1/2C2
each region becomes an autarky producing the whole range of varieties. In this case, when
the urban cost functions are the same across regions, the market outcome implies an even
distribution of activities. When φ starts rising from zero, symmetry is broken, implying
that ups and downs arise in the regionaldistribution.
Second, it is not clear how region sizes change with intermediate trade costs (C1/2(C2+
C3) ≤ τ ≤ C1/2C2). In other words, it seems hard to predict the evolution of a multi-
regional system once trade costs are neither high nor small.
6 On the number ofurban regions
So far, all regions were urban (λ∗
i > 0 for all i). However, it is important to ﬁgure out
how the number of urban regions is aﬀected by a fall in trade costs. This means that we
must dealwith equil ibrium in which some regions have no manufacturing sector. In order
to achieve this goal, we impose additional restrictions on the urban cost functions. More
precisely, we assume that each urban cost is linear and regions are re-indexed according
to the values of unit costs:
θi(y)=θi · y and θi ≤ θi+1 i =1 ,...,n − 1
23This assumption is justiﬁed when the urban space is linear, each worker consumes a ﬁxed
lot size for housing, and the commuting cost is proportional to distance. In this case,
Si(λi) can be rewritten as follows:
Si(λi)=C3τ
2[λ
o
i(τ) − λi]λi
where
λ
o
i(τ) ≡
C1τ − C2τ2 − θi
C3τ2
denotes the size of the manufacturing sector in region i for which Si(λi) = 0; we have
λo
i(τ) ≤ λo
j(τ) when i<j . Clearly, Si(λi) is a concave parabola passing through the
origin. Since λo
i(τ) may be negative, we set
λ
 
i ≡ max{0,λ
o
i(τ)} i =1 ,...,n
and we also deﬁne
Lm ≡
m  
j=1
λ
 
j m =1 ,...,n
Since θi ≤ θi+1 and since Si(λi) is a concave parabola, we have:
λ
 
i ≥ λ
 
i+1 for i =1 ,···,n− 1
Si(y) ≥ Si+1(y) for all y ≥ 0 and i =1 ,···,n− 1
S 
i(y) ≤ S 
i+1(y) for all y ≥ 0 and i =1 ,···,n− 1
As expected, for the same industrialsize, pseudo-surpl uses are higher in the regions
endowed with eﬃcient transport infrastructure. Hence, in equilibrium, there is a negative
relationship between commuting costs and the size of urban regions.
In Figure 2, we depict the case of an equilibrium in which regions 1 and 3 are urban
while regions 2 and 4 are rural because the regional surplus of region 4 is lower than the
equilibrium surplus Si(λ∗
i) in the other three regions or because the initialendowment of
region 3 is zero. This ﬁgure is suﬃcient to show that several such stable equilibria may
exist. For example, regions 1, 2 and 3 could also be active in equilibrium if the initial
endowment of 2 were positive.
Figure 2: Equilibrium with urban and rural regions
In the next lemma, we identify suﬃcient conditions for a stable equilibrium to exist.
24Lemma 6 If
λ
o
i(τ)  =0 and Lj  =1 j =1 ,...,n (34)
the system (8) has at least one stable equilibrium.
Proof: For any λ1 ≥ λ
 
1, it must be that S1(λ1) ≤ 0 and λ1 ≥ λo
1(τ). Thus, for i =2 ,...,n
we may deﬁne λi(λ1|Si = S1) as the larger solution to
Si(λi(λ1)) = S1(λ1)
so that
λi(λ1|Si = S1)=
λo
i(τ)+
 
[λo
i(τ)]2 +4 [ λ1 − λo
1(τ)]λ1
2
Clearly, λi(λ1) ≤ λ
 
i for i =2 ,...,n. Furthermore, Si(y) is strictly decreasing over
(λ
 
i,∞).
Three cases may arise.
(i) If Ln < 1, then there exists a unique λ∗
1 >λ
 
1 such that λ∗
1+
 n
i=2 λi(λ∗
1|Si = S1)=1 .
Hence,
λ ≡ (λ
∗
1,λ 2(λ
∗
1|S2 = S1),...,λ n(λ
∗
1|Sn = S1))
is a stable equilibrium.
(ii) If L1 > 1, then λ ≡ (1,0,···,0) is a stable equilibrium.
(iii) If the two conditions above are not met, there exists a region m ∈{ 2,...,n} such
that
Lm−1 < 1 < Lm (35)
Since Lm−1 < Lm, λo
m(τ) > 0 and, hence, λo
i(τ) > 0 for all i =1 ,...,m. Under (35),
Si(λi)=Sm(λm) has a single solution that belongs to the interval [λ
 
i/2,λ
 
i]. This solution
is given by:
λi(λm|Si = Sm)=
λo
i(τ)+
 
[λo
i(τ)]2 +4 [ λm − λo
m(τ)]λm
2
(36)
for i =1 ,···,m− 1. Let
fm(λm,τ) ≡ λm +
m−1  
i=1
λi(λm|Si = Sm)
25Since fm(0,τ) < 1 and fm(λ 
m,τ) > 1 from (35), we can always ﬁnd a value λ∗
m in (0,λ  
m)
such that fm(λ∗
m,τ) = 1, thus implying that
λ ≡ (λ1(λ
∗
m|S1 = Sm),...,λ m−1(λ
∗
m|Sm−1 = Sm),λ
∗
m,0,...,0)
is an equilibrium.
By direct calculation, we obtain
∂fm(λm,τ)
∂λm
=1 +
m−1  
i=1
2λm − λo
m(τ)
 
(λo
i(τ))2 +4 ( λm − λo
m(τ))λm
=1 +
m−1  
i=1
S 
m(λm)
S 
i(λi(λm|Si = Sm))
and
∂2fm(λm,τ)
∂λ2
m
=
m−1  
i=1
2[(λo
i(τ))2 − (λo
m(τ))2]
[(λo
i(τ))2 +4 ( λm − λo
m(τ))λm]3/2 ≥ 0 (37)
where the inequality follows from the deﬁnition of λo
i(τ) and θi ≤ θm for i =1 ,···,m−1.
Since
∂f2
m(λm,τ)
∂λ2
m
≥ 0,f m(λ
∗
m,τ)=1>f(0,τ) and λ
∗
m > 0
we have ∂fm(λ∗
m,τ)/∂λm > 0. Consequently,
1+
m−1  
i=1
S 
m(λ∗
m)
S 
i(λi(λ∗
m|Si = Sm))
> 0
Therefore, if
λm−1(λ
∗
m|Sm−1 = Sm) ∈ (λ
 
m−1/2,λ
 
m−1] and S
 
m−1(λm−1(λ
∗
m|Sm−1 = Sm)) < 0
then λ is a stable equilibrium. Indeed, otherwise, (36) would imply λm−1(λ∗
m|Sm−1 =
Sm) ∈ [λ
 
m−1/2,λ
 
m−1] so that we would have λm−1(λ∗
m|Sm−1 = Sm)=λ
 
m−1/2. In this case,
the inequality Si(y) ≥ Si+1(y) would entail Sm(y)=Sm−1(y) and, hence, λ∗
m = λ 
m/2.
Accordingly, we would have
1 > Lm−1 = Lm−2 +
λ
 
m−1
2
+
λ 
m
2
≥ fm(
λ 
m
2
,τ)=fm(λ
∗
m,τ)=1
a contradiction.    
This lemma implies that a stable equilibrium always exists (except for a ﬁnite number
of τ-values) but it does not say anything about the uniqueness of such an equilibrium.
26However, when Ln < 1, there is a single stable equilibrium. This is because Si(λ)i s
negative and decreasing on (λ
 
i,∞).
In the sequel, we consider the evolution of the manufacturing sector distribution when
trade costs decrease from a suﬃciently large value down to zero. In doing so, we assume
that (34) holds, thus excluding only a ﬁnite number of τ-values.
Let
mo ≡ min{m;m<n and ∃τ such that Lm(τ) > 1}
If mo does not exist, then the equilibrium conﬁguration involves dispersion for any trade
cost value. So for the problem to be meaningful, we assume from now on that mo exists.
For m =1 ,...,n− 1, solve λo
m =0 .I fC2
1 > 4C2θm, then there exist two realroots:
τ
+
m ≡
C1 +
 
C2
1 − 4C2θm
2C2
τ
−
m ≡
C1 −
 
C2
1 − 4C2θm
2C2
Set
m
+ ≡
 
min{m;Lm(τ+
m) > 1} if there is m satisfying Lm(τ+
m) > 1
n if no m satisﬁes Lm(τ+
m) > 1
m
− ≡
 
min{m;Lm(τ−
m) > 1} if there is m satisfying Lm(τ−
m) > 1
n if no m satisﬁes Lm(τ−
m) > 1
Since Li(τ
−
i )=Li−1(τ
−
i ) < 1 for i =1 ,...,m o (we set L0(τ) ≡ 0), it always holds that
mo <m −. Furthermore, since
λ
o
i(τ
−
m)=
θm − θi
C3(τ−
m)2 ≥
θm − θi
C3(τ+
m)2 = λ
o
i(τ
+
m) for i =1 ,...,m
we have Lm(τ−
m) ≥L m(τ+
m), so it always holds that m− ≤ m+. Hence we have
mo <m
− ≤ m
+
Since we assume that mo exists, we know that Ln(τ) > 1 holds for some τ. Therefore,
each of the two equations Lm+(τ) = 1 and Lm−(τ) = 1 always has two real roots. Deﬁne
the larger root of Lm+ =1a sτ+ and the smaller root of Lm− =1a sτ−. Then, since
Lm+(τ
+
m+) > 1 and Lm+(τ+) = 1 it must be that τ+ >τ
+
m+; similarly, we have τ− <τ
+
m−.
For any m, set
τm ≡
2
 m
i=1 θi
mC1
27For any given value of m, computing ∂Lm/∂τ shows that Lm is non-decreasing in τ for
τ<τ m and non-increasing in τ for τ>τ m. Therefore, Lm(τm) = maxτ Lm(τ).
Although there may exist several stable equilibria, we can choose a typical one which
displays the feature of agglomeration cascades.
Theorem 2 Assume that urban costs are linear. As trade costs decrease, there is a path
of stable equilibria such that the number of urban regions varies as follows.
(i) For large trade costs (τ>τ +), there is a single stable equilibrium and each region
accommodates a positive share of the manufacturing sector. The number of urban regions
suddenly decreases from n to m+ − 1 when τ reaches τ+.
(ii) For τ ∈ (τmo,τ+), the number of urban regions decreases or remains constant.
The number of urban regions is never smaller than mo.
(iii) For τ ∈ (τ−,τ mo), the number of urban regions increases or remains constant.
(iv) At τ = τ− the number of urban regions suddenly increases from m− −1 to n.F o r
low trade costs (τ<τ −), there is a single stable equilibrium and each region accommodates
a positive share of the manufacturing sector.
Proof: By deﬁnition, we have
Lm(τ)=
m  
i=1
λ
 
i(τ)=
m  
i=1
C1τ − C2τ2 − θi
C3τ2 for τ ∈ [τ
−
m,τ
+
m]
For all m, Lm is non-decreasing on [0,τ m] and non-increasing on [τm,∞). Therefore, it
is quasi-concave and reaches its maximum at τm. From Lmo(τmo) > 1 and mo ≤ m+,i t
follows that 1 < Lmo(τmo) ≤L m+(τmo). Since Lm+(τ) is quasi-concave and Lm+(τ+)=1 ,
we see that τmo <τ +. Similarly, τmo >τ −.
(i).F o rτ>τ +, we have
0 ≤ λ
 
n(τ) ≤ ...≤ λ
 
m+(τ) ≤ λ
 
m+(τ
+) ≤ λ
 
m+(τ
+
m+)=0
so λ
 
i(τ) = 0 for i = m+,...,n. Therefore,
Li(τ)
 
≤L m+(τ)i f i ≤ ma
= Lm+(τ)i f i ≥ ma
Since Lm+(τ) < Lm+(τ+) = 1, we have Li(τ) < 1 for i =1 ,...,nin either case. Conse-
quently, the unique stable equilibrium is such that each region has ﬁrms and workers. For
τ very close to τ+, the population in regions m+,···,nbecomes very small. Eventually,
when τ = τ+, the population in each region i = m+,···,nbecomes simultaneously zero,
28thus implying that the number of urban regions drops down to m+ −1. This equilibrium
is regular and, hence, stable.
The same argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to case (iv) in which τ ≤ τ−.
Before proceeding, observe that there may exist severalequil ibria when τ ∈ (τ−,τ+).
Among them, we choose the following one. For any given τ ∈ (τ−,τ+), there exists a
unique value m(τ) ≥ mo such that Lm(τ)−1(τ) < 1 < Lm(τ)(τ). Using the proof of Lemma
6, there is a stable equilibrium given by
λ
  =( λ1(λ
∗
m(τ)|S1 = Sm(τ)),...,λ m(τ)−1(λ
∗
m(τ)|Sm(τ)−1 = Sm(τ)),λ
∗
m(τ),0,...,0)
where fm(τ)(λ∗
m(τ),τ) = 1. Note that in this equilibrium, only m(τ) regions are urban.
(ii). Let us ﬁrst show that the following inequality holds for any τ ∈ (τmo,τ+):
Lm(τ)(x) > 1 for all x ∈ [τmo,τ] (38)
If τ ≥ τm(τ), then
Lm(τ)(x) ≥L m(τ)(τ) > 1 for all x ∈ [τm(τ),τ]
Lm(τ)(x) ≥L m(τ)(τmo) ≥L mo(τmo) > 1 for all x ∈ [τmo,τ m(τ)] (39)
If τ<τ m(τ), then (39) implies that (38) holds.
The inequality (38) implies that the number of urban regions cannot exceed m(τ)
when trade costs take the value x ∈ [τmo,τ]. Since this holds true for any τ ∈ (τmo,τ+),
the number of urban regions does not increase when τ decreases from τ+ to τmo.
Likewise, the following inequality tells us that the number of urban regions does not
decrease when τ<τ o:
Lm(τ)−1(x) < 1 for all x ∈ (0,τ)
This inequality holds since τ<τ mo ≤ τm(τ)−1. This covers Case (iii).
In addition, for any m<m o, we have Lm(τ) < 1 for all τ. Then, at any equilibrium
with m<nurban regions, it must be that Si(λ∗
i) < 0 for any urban region. This implies
that this equilibrium is unstable. As a result, mo is the smallest number of urban regions
at any stable equilibrium.    
Consequently, for suﬃciently large or suﬃciently small trade costs, each region has a
share of the manufacturing sector. In this case, the market outcome satisﬁes the main
29assumption of the foregoing section, explaining why results are consistent. However, for
intermediate values of these costs, the number of urban regions typically varies. Under
linear urban costs, it ﬁrst decreases and then increases. Hence, urban concentration ﬁrst
arises while re-dispersion comes afterwards. In addition, the minimum number of urban
regions may exceed 1, implying that the highest degree of agglomeration within the econ-
omy may involve several regions. This shows how the presence of urban costs may prevent
the full agglomeration into a single core region.
On the other hand, if the urban costs in region 1 are suﬃciently small such that
L1(τ1) > 1, or equivalently, θ1 ≤ C2
1/4(C2 + C3), then industry fully agglomerates into
a single region for intermediate values of the trade costs. Consequently, when trade
costs decrease while urban costs do not, the economy would move from dispersion to the
emergence of an urban giant and, then, would display gradual deconcentration.
Of course, some parts of the equilibrium path described in Theorem 2 may not arise.
This is so when trade costs are so high (Case (i)) for no interregionaltrade to occur.
Even the part corresponding to Case (ii) may not show. This happens when there are
no farmers (A = 0). Because of the existence of urban costs, the decrease in trade costs
induces a gradualdispersion of the industrialsector over a growing number of regions, as
in Helpman (1998).
Although our path of stable equilibria seems to involve unit changes in the number of
cities, we cannot exclude the simultaneous disappearance or emergence of several urban
regions. For example, starting from Sm > 0, the equilibrium becomes irregular (S 
m > 0)
before the smallest urban region m becomes rural. In this case, the stability condition
(12) is violated so that the size of region m may jump down to zero. From this moment
on, we do not know which path the economy will follow when there are multiple equilibria.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper suggests that the secular fall in transport and communication costs should lead
to a possibly strong concentration of mobile activities, which will eventually be followed
by a re-dispersion of these activities. In other words, the generalpattern of activities
as trade costs fall would be more or less ∩-shaped. However, much work remains to be
done in order to understand how regions evolve when trade costs take intermediate values,
while it is also important to ﬁgure out how the medium regions react to decreasing trade
costs.
Our modelhas dismissed the fact that commuting costs have decreased together with
trade costs. So, it would be interesting to study the impact of their relative change on the
30spatial structure of industry. Finally, it should be kept in mind that our model considers
a given and ﬁxed set of economic activities. In particular, the number of ﬁrms is the same
regardless of the value of trade costs. In this respect, the observed decline of the industrial
sector within big cities does not necessarily imply the economic and social decline of these
areas. The continuous decrease in communication and transport costs gives rise to new
economic activities that are typically information-oriented, and which, therefore, tend
to grow in large metropolises. Thus, one task for future research is to investigate this
question in a setting allowing ﬁrms and workers to locate “out in the burds”.
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B. Lemma B
Let Dij be the submatrix of D obtained by deleting the i-th row and j-th column. We
then have:
32Lemma B. If (12) holds at the equilibrium λ
∗, then
|D| > 0
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k) i =1 ,...,n− 1 (40)
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k) i,j =1 ,...,n− 1,i  = j (41)
Proof.(i) Using some basic properties of determinants, we obtain
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where the inequality follows from the stability condition (12).
(ii) We ﬁrst consider the case of i>1. By deﬁnition of Dii and some properties of
determinants, we have
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Next, for i = 1, we have
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(iii) We consider only the case where j<i . By straightforward calculation, we know
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C. ProofofLemma 2
For i =1 ,...,n− 1, it follows from (20) that
dλ∗
i(τ)
dτ
=
(−1)i
|D|
n−1  
j=1
(−1)
jzjDji
Using (40) and (41) in Appendix B, this expression becomes
(−1)i
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35For region n,
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D. Lemma D
Lemma D. If λ∗ is an asymmetric regular equilibrium, then regions h and l always
exist. Furthermore, when trade costs decrease, one and only one of the following three
relationships holds for each region i:
Case 1 : zi ≥ zh ⇒ region i shrinks (42)
Case 2 : zi = ze ⇒ the size of region i does not change (43)
Case 3 : zi ≤ zl ⇒ region i expands (44)
Proof: Let zi∗ = max{zi;i =1 ,...,n} and zj∗ = min{zi;i =1 ,...,n}. Since λ∗ is
asymmetric, zi∗ >z j∗ must hold and, hence,
n  
k=1
zi∗ − zk
−S 
k
≥
zi∗ − zj∗
−S 
j∗
> 0
n  
k=1
zj∗ − zk
−S 
k
≤
zj∗ − zi∗
−S 
i∗
< 0
Consequently, regions h and l always exist.
36In any regular equilibrium, −S 
k > 0 holds for all k =1 ,...,n. In Case 1, since
zi ≥ zh, we have:
n  
k=1
zi − zk
−S 
k
=( zi − zh)
n  
k=1
1
−S 
k
+
n  
k=1
zh − zk
−S 
k
≥
n  
k=1
zh − zk
−S 
k
> 0
Therefore, using (21) yields dλ∗
i(τ)/dτ > 0, implying that i becomes smaller. Cases 2 and
3 can be dealt with in a similar way.
For any region i, if neither (42) nor (43) holds, then
 n
k=1(zi − zk)/(−S 
k) < 0 holds
by (25). In this case, zi ≤ zl must be satisﬁed, which is precisely (44). Finally, more than
one of (42)-(44) cannot hold simultaneously.    
E. Lemma E
Lemma E. The following holds for any region k:
(i) zk = zh if and only if λ∗
k = λ∗
h;
(ii) zk = zm if and only if λ∗
k = λ∗
m;
(iii) zk = zl if and only if λ∗
k = λ∗
l.
Proof: (i) From (18), we have
0=zk − zh = n(λ
∗
k − λ
∗
h)[C1 − 2C2τ − 2C3τ(λ
∗
k + λ
∗
h)]
Then, (i) follows from (24). It can be shown that (ii) and (iii) hold by a similar argu-
ment.    
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